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ABSTRACT 
 
The position of old industrial regions (OIRs) has been neglected in recent regional 
development research, partly as a result of dominant discourses concerned with concepts 
such as the knowledge economy, learning regions and the new regionalism. One outcome 
of this conceptual overload is that empirical research has typically been confined to all 
too familiar case studies of regional success that tell a rather partial story. Yet the 
extension of the European integration project eastwards alongside growing competition 
from the urban and regional ‘hotspots’ of the global south prompts a series of largely 
unconsidered questions about the ability of OIRs to achieve sustainable economic 
development and social cohesion in the years ahead. Lacking the capital, technological 
and labour assets of more dynamic cities and regions, and with the historic legacy of 
deindustrialisation and the decline of traditional sectors, OIRs face some important 
dilemmas of adjustment and adaptation.  
 
In this paper our purpose is to engage with these issues through some preliminary 
empirical research into the recent fortunes of OIRs in Western Europe’s largest 
economies: France, Germany, Spain and the UK. Drawing upon material from the 
Eurostat database, our results hint at interesting patterns of divergence in the performance 
of OIRs in terms of processes of economic restructuring, employment change and social 
cohesion. In particular some important variations emerge in the trajectory of regions 
within different national contexts. Drawing upon recent thinking relating to commodity 
chains and global production networks, our results lead us to pose a series of questions 
that relate to the way regions are being repositioned within broader political and 
economic networks as part of unfolding processes of uneven development and changing 
spatial divisions of labour. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Since 1997 the United Kingdom has lost more than a million manufacturing jobs as the 
proportion of manufacturing employment in this country has declined to 11 % by 2005, 
with another 0.6 % in ‘Energy and Water’ and 6.8 % in ‘Construction’ employment, 
making the total for these three sectors (i.e. industry employment) just over 18 %. In 
1997 there were 4 ½ million people employed in manufacturing (15.8 %) which fell by 
around 25 % to 3.38 million in 2005 (11 %), although this structural change has 
disproportionately affected old industrial regions (OIRs) most as they have had to adjust 
to this sharp decline (Source: Office of National Statistics).i In many ways, the current 
UK and European regional academic and policy debates focused on a competitiveness-
driven agenda that promotes the development of ‘knowledge-driven’ or ‘knowledge-
based’ economies, which are meant to compete for shares of both national and global 
markets through ongoing processes of innovation and technology development (see 
Gardiner et al 2004; Brown 2005), have been unable to address this continuing process of 
uneven development.  
 
The focus on regional ‘competitiveness’ in both discourses has hidden the dramatic 
impact that the industrial structure changes have had upon regional economic 
performance and development, as the competitive position of these OIRs has been 
neglected in debates within the regional studies field, where research is dominated by 
theories centred upon concepts such as the knowledge economy (Cooke 2002), learning 
regions (Morgan 1997) and the new regionalism (Storper 1997). Furthermore, in the UK 
regional policy has, to some extent at least, moved away from the promotion of and 
search for inward investment towards the expansion of indigenous capacity as the 
government has adopted the perspective that 60 % of regional GDP differences can be 
explained in terms of ‘productivity’ (HM Treasury et al 2003). In these arguments 
regional productivity is characterised as driven by five factors: skills, investment, 
innovation, enterprise and competition (HM Treasury 2001). Concomitant with this 
national policy shift is the change at the European level where the policy emphasis 
embedded in the 2000 Lisbon Agenda (European Commission 2000) and the follow-up 
Sapir Group, formed in 2002, is aimed at enabling Europe to “become the most 
competitive and dynamic-knowledge-based economy with sustainable economic growth 
and greater social cohesion” (The Sapir Group 2005: 962).  
 
However, the policy focus at both the national and supranational scale entails a number of 
problematic assumptions around the conceptualisation of productivity and the closely 
linked notion of ‘competitiveness’; a theory that remains highly contentious (see 
Krugman 1996; Kitson et al 2004; Bristow 2005). One initial concern is that present 
policy, as Steve Fothergill (2005: 662) argues, has a “narrow base of evidence”, reliant, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, upon mainstream economic sources that embody an ahistorical 
and asocial understanding of regional development and economic performance. For 
example, the lack of concern with differences in industrial structure and divisions of 
labour, both continuing issues in wider regional research for decades, means that the 
policy focus on productivity ignores the “elementary observation that different industries 
and services have different levels of value added per head” (ibid.: 663). Such policy focus 
could also miss how processes of deindustrialisation leave regions with limited 
indigenous capacity because (a) the region has been reliant on large-scale production 
units with their own internalised set of intermediate services and capabilities, and (b) 
long-standing industries may rely more upon informal relationships that decline 
simultaneously with the hollowing-out of industrial sectors (see Hassink and Shin 2005).  
 
A secondary concern follows on from these last two points and relates to the problem of 
regional lock-in through path dependency (Dosi 1988; Arthur 1989, 1999). Because 
regional economies that are dependent upon particular industrial sectors, like 
manufacturing, are constituted through the operation of that particular industrial sector, 
the institutional and organisational actors in that region embed processes of production, 
consumption and linkages that embody particular structures of that sector – i.e. path 
dependence – which sits uneasily with the focus of policy on drivers of growth and 
innovation because the latter privileges the status quo (see Chapman et al 2004). Since 
regional performance has previously benefited from these embodied features there is little 
motivation to alter institutions or organisations, rather they are strengthened to more 
deeply embed the specific processes; i.e. locked-in. Consequently, as industrial structures 
change, whether through deliberate policy or accident, regional institutions and 
organisations lack the capacity to respond to this change through adaptation or 
adjustment. According to Tödtling and Trippl (2004) there is a lack of research on the 
renewal of such regions in the regional studies literature, which instead tends to focus on 
the development of emergent ‘clusters’ and innovation systems (however, see Pike 2001; 
Chapman et al 2004; Hudson 2005). The irony of this research agenda is that the so-
called ‘new regionalism’ (Lovering 1999) needs to be more suspicious of the embedding 
and institutionalisation of particular production systems or networks in specific regions 
because of the possibility that such processes will lock-in those regions to certain 
trajectories. 
 
In light of these issues, we have focused this paper on recent economic and employment 
performances across OIRs in EU15 countries, as a preliminary analysis of the context in 
which processes of adaptation and adjustment occur in regions that have experienced and 
are still experiencing industrial restructuring. These OIRs have seen a recent recovery in 
employment that can be attributed, in part, to considerable levels of regional policy 
intervention and active labour market policies at European, national and local scales, 
alongside the growth of service-related forms of employment. With the safety net of EU 
regional policy assistance being withdrawn or scaled back in the near future, and OIRs 
becoming more exposed to competition from other regions, the way that OIRs are 
becoming repositioned within changing spatial divisions of labour both at the European 
and the global levels becomes of critical importance. In this respect, lacking the capital, 
technological and labour assets of more dynamic cities and regions, and with the historic 
legacy of deindustrialisation and the decline of traditional sectors, OIRs face some 
important dilemmas of adjustment and adaptation.  
 
In this paper we engage with these issues through some preliminary empirical research 
into the recent fortunes of OIRs in four of Western Europe’s largest economies: France, 
Germany, Spain and the UK. Drawing upon material from the Eurostat database, our 
point of departure is to compare the relative performance of selected OIRs within 
different national contexts over the period 1996-2002. We start by comparing different 
performance indicators, namely gross domestic product (GDP), GDP purchasing power 
standards (PPS), and employment. This reveals quite startling differences, particularly 
between GDP performance and employment performance. This in turn leads us to 
question the utility of GDP and the discourse of regional competitiveness, and to focus 
upon employment creation in order to take a broader social perspective on regional 
development and adaptation. We therefore unpack employment performance across the 
different regions by focusing upon the different components of employment change 
before concluding with some initial speculation about the broader processes at work in 
shaping different regional development pathways.  
 
2.  REVISITING OLD INDUSTRIAL REGIONS 
 
EU Enlargement and Less Favoured Regions 
The European Union (EU) has changed dramatically since its origins in the Benelux 
Customs Union (1948) and the Treaty of Paris (1951) that established the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC). The successive waves of enlargement have broadened the 
EU so that it now covers 25 countries from Ireland to Estonia, and Finland to Malta (see 
Figure 1), whilst the expansion of supra-national governance structures have deepened 
the policy influence and impact of its decision-making (Williams 1992, 1996; Smith 
2002; Leibovitz 2003). As the EC (now EU) expanded throughout this period, it has had 
to adapt its policies to address the uneven development of member and accession 
countries and their regional economies through a range of policy tools. Created by the 
1957 Treaty of Rome, the European Social Fund (ESF) is the oldest form of ‘structural 
funding’ in the EU, followed by the 1962 establishment of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) (Williams 1992). With the accession of Britain in 1973, there was increased 
support for regional assistance leading to the creation of the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) designed to alleviate the problems of deindustrialisation in 
OIRs in the UK and poor development in the Italian Mezzorgiorno region (Tondl 2001; 
Armstrong and Taylor 2004; EC Regional Policy DG 2004). During the 1980s, alongside 
the implementation of the Single European Market (SEM) and the accession of Greece, 
Portugal and Spain, these EU level Structural Fund programmes were reformed (in 1988) 
and directed at assisting lagging regions and reducing imbalances, a policy reinforced 
with the creation of the Cohesion Funds in 1994 (Tondl 2001). Despite the growing 
importance of these European level programmes, it is crucial to stress that public 
expenditure is still predominantly based at the national scale with public spending by 
European national governments representing between 40 % and 60% of GDP compared 
with European spending capped at around 1.2 % of EU GDP (Hudson 2003: 56; see also 
Dunford and Perrons 1994). 
Figure 1: Map of European Union Enlargement 
 
 
 
The extension of the European integration project eastwards alongside growing 
competition from the urban and regional ‘hotspots’ of the global south prompts a series of 
largely unconsidered questions about the ability of OIRs to achieve sustainable economic 
development and social cohesion in the years ahead, especially after nearly half a century 
of de-industrialisation and uneven development. The peak of absolute industrial 
employment in Europe was 1970, although several countries such as the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Sweden and the UK peaked during the 1960s with the UK, for example, 
reaching a relative peak in industrial employment in 1960; the first in Europe (Townsend 
1997; Sadler 2000). Whilst both the USA and Canada reached their relative peaks before 
the 1960s, the later zenith of relative industrial employment in Europe was delayed by 
several decades (see Table 1). By the early 1980s most European countries had reached 
the relative peak of industrial employment, even if some countries took until the early 
1990s to reach the absolute peak (e.g. Portugal and Greece) (Townsend 1997).  
 
Table 1: Relative Industrial Employment in European Union Countries 1965 and 1995 
 Relative Industrial Labour Force (%) 
  1965 1975 1985 1995 
Austria 45 n.a. 38.1 35.4 
Belgium 46 39.9 31.8 28.3 
Denmark 37 31.5 27.9 27.1 
Finland 36 n.a. 31.9 27.9 
France 39 38.7 32.4 26.9 
F.R. Germany 48 46 41 36 
Greece 24 29.2 25.7 23.2 
Ireland 28 30.5 30 31.4 
Italy 42 39.1 33.5 32.1 
Luxembourg n.a. 46.3 32 25.5 
Netherlands 41 34.6 28.2 22.8 
Portugal 31 33.8 33.9 32.2 
Spain 35 38.3 31.8 30.2 
Sweden 43 n.a. 29.9 26.6 
United Kingdom 47 40.7 34.6 27.4 
EU15 n.a. n.a. n.a. 30.3 
 
SOURCE: Adapted from Williams (1992: 51) for 1965 and Hudson (1999: 33) for 1975-1995. 
 
The decline in industrial employment has continued throughout the 1990s and 2000s. The 
response to this continuing deindustrialisation has been oriented towards specific policy 
actions that have often failed to deal with the impact of industrial decline, especially in 
relation to the effect of the uneven regional spread of industrial employment and 
changing features of employment, unemployment and inactivity. 
 
It would be a mistake to position these changes in industrial structure within a 
homogenous process of national and regional economic convergence, or more crucially 
now divergence, as capitalism has “developed territorially specific forms in Europe” like 
the Anglo-Saxon, corporate Rhineland, Scandinavian, and Southern Europe models 
suggested by Hudson (2003: 49-50). All these models have encountered, in one way or 
another, the problem of continuing and persistent uneven development within less-
favoured regions and across national and European regions (Dunford and Smith 2000; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi 2004). Although there was a convergence between regions 
after World War II, this has since stalled in Europe during and since the 1980s with the 
ascendancy of regional academic and policy emphases on ‘successful regions’ and 
European integration based on neoliberal precepts (Dunford and Perrons 1994; Agnew 
2000); this programme has since spread Eastwards as transition economies in Eastern 
Europe have sought accession and adopted prescribed policy initiatives to achieve it (see 
Smith 2002; Swain 2005). It could be argued that the overall effect of the SEM has itself 
been unevenly spread as ‘core regions’ have benefited from the expansion of the internal 
market through greater economies of scale that enable the expansion of transnational 
production networks and the persistence of international division of labour, whilst 
regional production networks are hollowed out and left unable to compete effectively 
(Dent 1997; Hudson 1999, 2003; Smallbone et al 1999; Dunford 2003; Morgan 2004). 
 
The 1980s and Old Industrial Regions 
In the debates from the 1980s on the deindustrialisation of old industrial regions there 
was a stress on the effects of industrial restructuring on regional employment and 
regional uneven development, represented as the consequence of capital accumulation 
that operated at a global scale (Carney 1980; Carney et al 1980; Lewis 1984; Hudson 
1988). The uneven development of ‘old’ industries and their industrial regions resulted 
from the centring of production near coalfields, which provided the resources and means 
to expand other industrial sectors like steel and metal processing (i.e. shipbuilding), as 
well as the dominance of international markets through the control of imperial colonies, 
particularly for Britain (Judge and Dickson 1987; Hudson 1988). These regions 
developed organisational and institutional structures specific to their peculiar features; i.e. 
large, oligopolistic conglomerates based in large production plants that relied on a 
unionised, labour force (Hudson 1988, 1994). Later, in the early twentieth century, mass 
production practices meant that sites of accumulation shifted to urban areas in order to 
access more easily the markets of both supply (i.e. labour) and demand (i.e. consumers), 
whilst later still in the mid twentieth century, post-Fordist production once more shifted 
industry, this time overseas (Hudson 1992). The major works of David Harvey 
(1999[1982]) and Doreen Massey (1995[1984]) were also significant contributions to this 
debate in highlighting the importance of these spatial and temporal processes in the 
organisation and relations of production, leading to the identification of localities as 
crucial sites of research, a continuing concern throughout the last few decades (see Scott 
2000).  
 
The earlier academic debates about old industrial regions and deindustrialisation in the 
early 1980s provide a means to engage with the present issues around European less-
favoured regions, particularly those that are still experiencing industrial restructuring, 
from a historical and dynamic perspective that can contribute to the analysis of how 
certain regions face problems of industrial ‘lock-in’ through path dependency (Arthur 
1989, 1999). These concepts are derived from the literature on evolutionary economics 
(Nelson and Winter 1982) and systems of innovation (Freeman 1982), especially in the 
cross-disciplinary work between these two theories (e.g. Dosi 1988), although the more 
recent geographic engagement in this topic (see the editorial by Hassink and Shin 2005) 
stresses the importance of balancing the dominant regional performance paradigm, which 
promotes the development of regional indigenous capacity (i.e. learning regions) and 
specialisation (i.e. clusters), with an appreciation that this approach is inherently risky 
because it privileges an understanding based on continuity rather than dynamic adaptation 
and adjustment (see Chapman 2005). The very concept of path-dependency itself has 
been critiqued by Jamie Peck (2005: 153) as an ‘over-socialised’ framework. It therefore 
provides much less insight into regional adaptation and adjustment than perhaps the 
arguments put forward by Ray Hudson (2005: 583) on path-contingency which as a 
concept he argues “captures the character of the growth process, and in particular the 
transition from growth to decline, more adequately than does that of path dependency”. 
 
Alongside these concerns with industrial or sectoral path dependence and lock-in, there 
are wider questions over the problem of a broader ‘lock-in’ to particular economic 
strategies and ideologies, such as those encompassed by neoliberal discourses and 
policies (Peck 2004) or the ‘American Economic Model’ (Kitson 2005). In their work, 
Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell stress the need to understand neoliberalism not as a 
“naturalized, external force” that produces globalising effects, but rather as a “self-
actualizing” discourse that through the prescriptive institutionalisation of specific policies 
and structures has important economic and development consequences, often unevenly 
spread (Peck and Tickell 2002: 382). These consequences are geographically situated in 
that policies taken to benefit one region impact upon other regions; for example, Jamie 
Peck (2001) argues that the interest-rate policies of the Bank of England have led to 
manufacturing job losses in the north of England as a result of a policy to control 
inflation in the South-east and London. Overall then there is the possibility that “[t]his 
produces a neoliberal “lock-in” to public-sector austerity and growth-chasing economic 
development” (Peck and Tickell 2002: 394), where the consequences for certain regions 
are placed above those of other regions.ii 
 
Defining Old Industrial Regions 
In setting out to explore issues of adaptation and adjustment in OIRs, our primary 
concern is with those regions that were at the forefront of early industrialisation in the 
European economy, geared to the exploitation of coal and other raw materials. These 
regions were at the forefront of capitalist development in the period from 1840 to the 
1920s; a phase termed extensive accumulation (Aglietta 1979; Hudson 1988, 1989; 
Cumbers 1996) because the key drivers of the capitalist economy were the production of 
capital goods and infrastructure industries such as iron and steel, shipbuilding, heavy 
engineering, and railway engineering. Subsequently, with the shift in the economy 
throughout the twentieth century firstly into Fordist mass consumption sectors and 
subsequently into post-Fordist electronic and information technology sectors, these 
regions have become increasingly marginal as growth regions of the capitalist economy, 
whilst facing increased foreign competition in traditional industries and therefore have 
been faced with relatively long term problems of adjustment and adaptation (Hudson 
1992, 1994). Various waves of regional policy have also been directed at these regions 
since the end of the Second World War – both from national and European levels of 
governance – to varying success, but what characterised these regions up until the late 
1970s and early 1980s was a continuing reliance upon their traditional sectors, despite 
efforts at diversification into newer growth sectors. In this context, our concern here is 
with how further European integration and increased competition from the mid 1990s and 
beyond will impact upon these regions. 
 
There are several problems to confront in attempting to develop a typology of old 
industrial regions (OIR) in Europe, particularly problems of (a) sectoral definition and 
classification, (b) the availability of data, (c) different periods of industrialisation, and (d) 
subsequent ‘peaks’ in industrialisation in different countries (see Townsend 1997; Sadler 
2000). Largely for pragmatic reasons of data availability and geographical comparability 
between different countries, we have taken a definition of OIRs based upon old mining 
areas, although there are clearly areas outside in textile, shipbuilding and engineering 
industries that could also be identified as OIRs. Consequently we have drawn upon a 
redrafting of several regional typologies from the early 1980s by Allan Williams’s 
(1992), which separate regions into areas of slow and rapid capital accumulation, and 
based upon a timeframe between the mid 1970s and early 1980s – the key period of 
economic crisis that has faced Europe’s old industrial regions since the end of the Second 
World War. In a more recent classification, Rodríguez-Pose (1998a) provided an updated 
definition based on nationally weighted GDP and mean annual growth that identifies a 
number of the same regions (see also Rodríguez-Pose 1998b), but positions several of the 
OIRs we identify in a more intermediate and dynamic position, although this appears to 
be a result of his use of a larger regional scale (i.e. NUTS1).  
 
Notes on Methodology 
This definition covers some of the worst economic ‘blackspots’ across European 
countries during the early 1980s, including the Ruhr and Saar regions of Germany, North-
east France, the Basque region of Spain and the UK coalfields (see Williams 1992: 250). 
We have used a paper by Beatty, Fothergill and Powell (2005) to identify UK coalfield 
regions. Because we have drawn our data from Eurostat we have identified regions based 
upon NUTS2 designations as shown in Table 1 and Figure 2.  
Figure 2: Map of Old Industrial Regions in the Largest European States 
 
 
Although these NUTS2 designations are by no means unproblematic – for example, 
Munster and ‘West Wales and the Valleys’ include large rural areas – they represent the 
closest area designations for our typology that also contain consistent data for the time 
period we are considering. It also avoids the problem of using too large a regional 
designation (see last section), yet still ensures that there is a consistent, comparative data 
available from Eurostat. 
 
Table 1: European Old Industrial Region Designations 
OIR Typology NUTS2 Region NUTS2 Code 
Ruhr 
 
 
Saar 
Düsseldorf  
Münster 
Arnsberg  
Saarland 
dea1 
dea3 
dea5 
dec0 
North-east France Picardie 
Nord Pas-de-Calais 
Lorraine 
fr22 
fr30 
fr41 
Basque country Pais Vasco es21 
UK coalfields Tees Valley & Durham 
Northumberland, Tyne & Wear  
Lancashire 
South Yorkshire 
Derbyshire & Nottinghamshire 
Shropshire & Staffordshire 
West Wales & The Valleys 
South Western Scotland 
ukc1 
ukc2 
ukd4 
uke3 
ukf1 
ukg2 
ukl1 
ukm3 
 
All the data in the following analysis was drawn from Eurostat Regional Data for the 
years 1996 and 2002. This period represented the furthest back that it is possible to go 
using Eurostat data at the NUTS 2 level and the most up-to-date data available for all the 
indicators at the time of the data collection. The specific indicators for economic 
performance – i.e. GDP and GDP (PPS) – were derived from the Economic Accounts 
datasets, whilst the indicators for employment performance were derived from the 
Science and Technology datasets to provide consistence in the comparison of data on total 
employment and other employment indicators; i.e. high-tech, low-tech, manufacturing, 
services etc.  
3.  THE CHANGING ECONOMIC AND EMPLOYMENT PERFORMANCE OF 
EUROPEAN OLD INDUSTRIAL REGIONS 
 
Comparing Economic Performance 
In relation to economic performance, characterised by change in gross domestic product 
(GDP), there is a unmistakable pattern of strong growth in British OIRs over the period 
1996 – 2002, clearly outperforming all the other European regions although largely 
related to strong growth in the national economy as a whole (see Figure 4). The worst 
performing regions were those in Germany, although French regions also performed 
below the EU average. What appears quite clear from these figures is that, in GDP terms 
at least, the performance of OIRS is strongly linked to national economic performance. In 
this respect, it is worth noting that overall, despite their strong performance against the 
EU15 average, all UK OIRs were below the national increase.  
 
Figure 4: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) % Change 1996-2002 
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SOURCE: Eurostat, Economic Accounts 
 
The difference in GDP performance between OIRs is reduced significantly when 
considering GDP in terms of Purchasing Power Standards (PPS).iii Using the indicator 
GDP (PPS) reduces the difference between the highest and lowest regional changes from 
around an eight-fold difference (76 versus 9.7) to around a two-and-a-half-fold difference 
(48.5 versus 19.6). Furthermore, using this measure also means that four UK regions 
(Tees Valley, Lancashire, Shropshire and Staffordshire, and West Wales) now fall below 
the EU15 average increase (33.3%) between 1996 and 2002 (see Figure 5). The regions 
with the highest increase also change; Spain and Pais Vasco are now above the UK and 
its regions.  
 
Figure 5: GDP Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) % Change 1996-2002 
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SOURCE: Eurostat, Economic Accounts 
 
Because we are interested in the OIRs relative performance as well, and because of the 
differences in performance between GDP and GDP (PPS), we indexed regional GDP 
(PPS) change against national performance. It is evident from the indexed data that the 
GDP (PPS) performance of the British OIRs is significantly less impressive than the 
initial data on GDP alone suggests (see Figure 6). Between the years in question, no 
British, or French, regions performed better than the national economy with Tyne Tees, 
Lancashire and West Wales having the worst relative performance across all four 
countries. In fact, the only OIRs that achieved above national growth were Pais Vasco 
and Saarland, suggesting that the comparison of raw GDP figures might disguise the 
continuing persistence of uneven development in these particular regions, if not more 
widely.  
 
Figure 6: National Index of GDP PPS Change 1996-2002 
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SOURCE: Eurostat, Economic Accounts 
 
The next indicator we considered was employment change, which again alters the view of 
regional performance. Whilst, in line with Beatty et al’s (2005) commentary on the UK 
coalfield regions, we can comment on a general upturn in the fortunes of Europe’s OIRs 
over the period since mid 1990s, the best performing OIRs are in France and Spain (see 
Figure 7). Interestingly, total employment rose higher than the national rise in all of 
Germany’s OIRs, all of France’s OIRs, but just two of the UK’s OIRs (South Yorkshire 
and Derbyshire & Nottinghamshire). Only in France, Spain and one UK region 
(Derbyshire & Nottinghamshire) was the rise higher than the EU rise (8.8%). The two 
regions with the lowest rises were both in the UK; Tees Valley & Durham (0%) and 
South Western Scotland (0.3%).  
 Figure 7: Total Employment % Change 1996-2002: Old Industrial Regions in the EU15 
EU15
Germany (including ex-GDR 
from 1991)
Düsseldorf
Münster
Arnsberg
Saarland
Spain
Pais Vasco
France
Picardie
Nord - Pas-de-Calais
Lorraine
United Kingdom
Tees Valley & Durham
Northumberland, Tyne & Wear
Lancashire
South Yorkshire
Derbyshire & Nottinghamshire
Shropshire & Staffordshire
West Wales & The Valleys
South Western Scotland
0 10 20 30
O
ld
 In
du
st
ria
l R
eg
io
n
Total Employment % Change 1996 to 2002
 
SOURCE: Eurostat, Science and Technology 
 
A national index of total employment data once again illustrates the poor performance of 
the British OIRs against the national average in creating employment (see Figure 8); the 
lowest performing region was Tees Valley with a national index of -99.8 (national equals 
0). Only two British OIRs (Derbyshire and South Yorkshire) are above the national 
average and even then not significantly so, especially in comparison with both German 
and French OIRs. These countries OIRs performed notably better than the national 
average with no region having a lower national index than 47.7; the highest being 
Saarland at 310.1. Interestingly Pais Vasco performs poorly on this measure, although not 
a badly as UK regions, suggesting that the national performance of Spain is particularly 
good.   
 
Figure 8: National Index of Employment Change 1996-2002 
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A preliminary interpretation and analysis of these figures reveals three things. First, there 
is a sharp contrast between performance in employment and GDP growth across nations 
and OIRS within Europe. Nationally the UK performs well in terms of GDP growth but 
less well in relation to employment, although the dramatic improvement in GDP is 
reduced somewhat when considering performance in terms of PPS. The performance of 
UK regions is also significantly lower than other European OIRs when indexed against 
national performance, suggesting that UK regions are adapting less well to their changing 
position than other national OIRs. Second, all nations and regions perform better, apart 
from the UK, when GDP is contrasted with GDP (PPS); perhaps illustrating the higher 
costs of living in the UK. The difference is less marked with Spain (and Pais Vasco) than 
with Germany, especially, and France. Thus it would appear that straight GDP growth 
does not accurately reflect the benefits that may accrue to a region’s residents from 
economic performance. In this respect, a final point to make here is that whilst the 
performance of OIRs is related quite strongly to national trends when measured by GDP, 
greater divergence appears when we consider employment. What is particularly striking 
is that, whereas OIRs in France and Germany outperform the national average, in the UK 
this only applies to two areas with the remaining six continuing to perform well below the 
national trend.  
 
Engaging in some initial analysis and speculation about the variation in these figures for 
employment performance, the figures do not lead to any clear confirmation of the 
obvious and most popular theoretical arguments and claims about regional 
competitiveness. For example, there does not seem to be any obvious relationship with 
regional governance and autonomy. French regions, which have some of the lowest levels 
of devolved power, do far better than the German OIRs. The Welsh and Scottish OIRs are 
outperformed by their English counterparts. At the same time, there appears to be little 
correlation with national governance systems, making it difficult to support either 
neoliberalist or more social democratic arguments for regional competitiveness. The more 
deregulated and flexible economy of the UK produces wide-ranging performance among 
its OIRs, which are all surpassed by the performance of the traditionally more statist and 
interventionist culture within which French OIRs are embedded. The German OIRs with 
their highly regulated and advanced training systems lag behind most UK OIRs in terms 
of employment creation, although not when indexed against national performance.  A 
second cut at regional competitiveness is therefore required that begins to get beneath 
these aggregate figures to explore changing components of change and what these reveal 
about how regions are being repositioned within broader divisions of labour. 
 
Unpacking Employment Variation 
a. Manufacturing Employment Change 
 
An interesting, yet little commented upon, fact in recent economic policy discourse is that 
there was a slight increase in ‘manufacturing employment’ (NACE category D) across 
the EU15 states of 1.3% between 1996 and 2002 (see Figure 9). Once again though, this 
varied significantly across the OIRs ranging between +31.4% (Pais Vasco) and -30.5% 
(South Western Scotland). However, the fact that some OIRs in national economies with 
high wages and social costs like France and Germany can register strong employment 
growth in manufacturing – at a time of increased global and European integration – goes 
against some of the popular and indeed academic stereotypes about the inevitability of 
deindustrialisation and the flight of capital to low cost locations in Eastern Europe or the 
developing world. 
 
Figure 9: Total Manufacturing (NACE D) Employment % Change 1996-2002 
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In contrast to the data on total employment change, the figures for manufacturing change 
in the OIRs reveal a dramatic cleavage between different countries. The OIRs which had 
the largest decreases in manufacturing employment were all in the UK and apart from 
South Yorkshire all have higher percentage losses than any other European OIR. 
Nationally the UK lost 12.3% of manufacturing employment with four regions losing 
more than this percentage: Derbyshire & Nottinghamshire (-14.3%), Northumberland & 
Tyne & Wear (-20%), West Wales & the Valleys (-21.2%), and South Western Scotland 
(-30.5%). Of the other European regions only German ones – Dusseldorf (-4.5%) and 
Arnsberg (-3.6%) – had a fall in manufacturing employment and at a much lower level 
than in the UK. 
 
Using NACE categories, we have further broken down manufacturing employment into 
high-tech and low-tech activities. Employment change in high-tech (HT) and medium 
high-tech (MHT) manufacturing for the same period mirrors that for total manufacturing 
change with a sharp discrepancy between the performance of UK OIRs and the rest (see 
Figure 10).iv  Once again the worst performing regions were West Wales and the Valleys 
(-31.8%) and South West Scotland (-34.5%). In all the Spanish and French OIRs there 
were increases in employment above the EU15 level, whereas in the UK in all but one 
region (South Yorkshire) there was a decrease in such employment; all were still below 
the EU15 average. In four regions this decrease was above -20% and five regions had 
falls greater than the national fall (-7.8%). In two German regions (Munster and Saarland) 
there were increases above the EU15 and national increases, whilst in two other regions 
there were decreases, particularly marked in Arnsberg (-9%), with a more marginal 
employment decline in the Dusseldorf region (-1.1%). Pais Vasco was on a par with the 
national change in Spain. 
 
Figure 10: High-tech and Medium High-tech Manufacturing Employment % Change 
1996-2002 
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The employment change in low-tech (LT) and medium low-tech (MLT) manufacturing 
was similar to that for changes in total and high-tech manufacturing with the main 
difference being the worse performance of the German OIRs with two out of four 
recording employment decline (see Figure 11).v Once again the French and Spanish 
regions recorded increases in employment; higher than the national average in both cases. 
All UK regions had a decrease in employment, with the greatest being in South Western 
Scotland (-26.7%), although five regions had lower falls than the national average 
suggesting either (a) that these regions may still be more dependent on manufacturing 
employment than the UK more generally, especially South Yorkshire and Lancashire, or 
(b) that the manufacturing employment in some regions has been more affected by 
processes of deindustrialisation than other regions; i.e. certain sectors have been hollowed 
out more thoroughly or rapidly than others. 
 Figure 11: Low-tech and Medium Low-tech Manufacturing Employment % Change 
1996-2002 
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b. Service Sector Employment Change 
 
Employment in the service sector rose by 13.3 % between 1996 and 2002 for the whole 
of the EU15 (see Figure 12). Spain had a significant national increase above this level 
(over twice the EU level), whereas Germany and France had national increases below the 
EU15 average. The UK had a slightly higher increase of 14 %. Despite Spain’s national 
increase, service sector employment change in Pais Vasco was closer to the EU15 
average, whilst all French regions (Lorraine – the highest increase of any region at 
30.9%) had increases higher than the EU and national averages. All German regions fell 
below the EU average increase; although the German regions were higher than the 
national increase. Five UK regions were above the EU average and four regions were also 
higher than the national increase. The region with the lowest increase was Tees Valley 
and Durham in the UK which only had an increase of 3.2%. 
 
Figure 12: Total Services (NACE G-Q) Employment % Change 1996-2002 
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One of the main differences in the pattern of employment change in services, compared 
to that of manufacturing, is in the marked increase in hi-tech knowledge-intensive 
services (KIS) in Germany and the UK (see Figure 13).vi In the former case all OIRs out-
performed their national average, whilst in the latter case three regions did. The most 
striking change was the increase nationally for Spain (69.2%) accompanied by almost no 
change in Pais Vasco (0.3%). 
Figure 13: Hi-tech Knowledge-intensive Services Employment % Change 1996-2002 
EU15
Germany (including ex-GDR 
from 1991)
Düsseldorf
Münster
Arnsberg
Saarland
Spain
Pais Vasco
France
Picardie
Nord - Pas-de-Calais
Lorraine
United Kingdom
Tees Valley & Durham
Northumberland, Tyne & Wear
Lancashire
South Yorkshire
Derbyshire & Nottinghamshire
Shropshire & Staffordshire
West Wales & The Valleys
South Western Scotland
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
O
ld
 In
du
st
ria
l R
eg
io
n
High-tech Knowledge-Intensive Services Employment % Change 1996 to 2002
 
SOURCE: Eurostat, Science and Technology 
 
In relation to less-KIS employment change, German regions split between increasing 
between 7-12% and decreasing slightly (see Figure 14). This time Pais Vasco increased 
more than the EU average, but still less than Spain nationally, whereas all the French 
regions increased more than the French national average and the EU average. In the UK 
five regions had increases above the national average, as well as above the EU average. 
However, one region (Tees Valley and Durham) decreased by 3.4%. 
 
Figure 14: Less-KIS Employment Change 1996-2002: Old Industrial Regions in the 
EU15 
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c. Total High-technology Employment Change 
For a final piece of analysis, we have compared employment change in high-tech 
activities (both manufacturing and services) across OIRs (see Figure 15) and indexed 
against national averages (see Figure 16). Data on these changes illustrate that there are 
significant differences between British regions, in the expansion of high-tech 
employment, as well as with other European OIRs. For example, French regions perform 
particularly well, being above both EU15 and national averages, whilst most German 
regions perform above the national average. In contrast Pais Vasco performs well against 
other European regions and the EU15 average, but less well against the national change. 
Thus, despite the good performance of British regions in relation to service employment, 
most UK regions’ overall high-tech performance is poor, except for South Yorkshire and 
Lancashire.  
 
Figure 15: Total Hi-Tech Employment % Change (Manufacturing and Services) 1996-
2002 
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The poor performance of British regions is reinforced when the data are indexed against 
national changes in total high-tech employment. The position of British regions, 
particularly those in Wales, Scotland and the north of England, illustrate the extent to 
which these regions have failed to adapt to the industrial restructuring engendered by the 
shift towards a ‘knowledge-based’ economy as they continue to lag behind the rest of the 
country, despite active regional policies going back to the late 1920s (Armstrong and 
Taylor 2004). Their failure to capture a share of recent and emerging knowledge 
industries is compounded by the continuing decline in less skilled and more traditional 
manufacturing industries. In marked contrast, all the OIRs in the other European 
countries (with the exception of Arnberg in German and Pais Vasco in Spain, which 
anyway recorded a strong increase and for which the figure reflects a relative low level of 
prior industrialisation in much of the rest of the country) have performed better than the 
national average suggesting strong abilities to adapt to a changing environment. 
 Figure 16: National Index of Total Hi-tech Employment Change 1996-2002 
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4.  CONCLUSION: REPOSITIONING OLD INDUSTRIAL REGIONS IN THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 
 
The marked differential in the performance of UK regions in relation to those in the other 
EU states leads us to speculate theoretically that both regional and national systems of 
economic governance and policy coordination continue to be critical in facilitating 
processes of successful adaptation and adjustment to changes in both the European and 
global economies. Whilst the starkest contrasts are with the French OIRs and Pais Vasco, 
the poorer performance compared to the German OIRs, in terms of creating 
manufacturing jobs in particular, in some ways raises the most interesting set of issues. 
Given the German economy’s widely publicised problems of high unemployment, the 
difficulties in handling the transition following unification, and its greater proximity to 
the lower wage and less regulated labour markets of the new Eastern European accession 
states, we might have expected a much greater decline in employment in these regions. 
Yet, with the exception of low-tech manufacturing - where the performance is still better 
than that of the UK – the picture (from these figures at least) appears to be one of 
relatively successful adjustment during this period. Whether this will continue as greater 
European integration proceeds is a moot point of course. 
 
In interpreting these trends further, we would however emphasise the importance of 
going beyond national level explanations, to develop a perspective that considers the way 
regions and states are being repositioned within broader spatial production networks as 
part of shifting international divisions of labour (Hudson 1988, 2002; Dunford 2003). 
These changing spatial relations have been explored using a number of diverse 
approaches, such as world systems theory (e.g. Hopkins and Wallerstein 1986) and the 
related global commodity chains literature (e.g. Gereffi 1994, 1996), which also built on 
work on the new international division of labour (see Henderson et al 2002). Other 
approaches in business strategy, such as national business systems (Whitley 1996) and 
value chains (Porter 1990), have also been popular, whilst there is a growing ‘cultural’ 
turn in research on consumption and ‘systems of provision’ (Fine and Leopold 1993; see 
also Leslie and Reimer 1999; Hughes 2000). However, it is the work on global 
production networks (GPN) that proves the most useful concept to apply to research on 
old industrial regions. Without accepting the hyperbole of globalisation discourse 
(Dicken 2004), it is important in this respect to understand how regional development 
prospects are increasingly bound up and embedded within wider sets of spatial relations 
beyond the national level, and in particular how regional adjustment is linked to the 
international and global production networks within which a region’s firms are embedded 
(see Dicken et al 2001; Henderson et al 2002; Coe et al 2004). 
 
According to Henderson et al (2002: 447), all GPN have to be considered as multi-scalar 
in that they range “from the local and regional to the national and global and back again” 
and consist of three main features: value, power and embeddedness. It therefore 
recognises that different firms, sectors, networks and institutions operate across multiple 
scales, thereby breaking the national-centric focus of many other approaches, whilst also 
avoiding the ahistorical concentration on existing global commodity chains, rather than 
on processes of development and decline (Henderson et al 2002; Coe et al 2004). An 
implicit assumption in the GPN concept is the combination of both the diffusion and 
concentration of production, depending upon the complexity and ‘capital-intensity’ of the 
activity within the value chain, without the need to privilege any particular scale (Coe and 
Yeung 2001; Ernst and Kim 2002). Consequently different locations embed different 
aspects of the GPN at different times and at different strengths of ‘stickiness’, and 
subsequently they have differing abilities to withstand economic changes like industrial 
restructuring (Markusen 1996). Thus regional performance is constituted by the internal 
and external capabilities of its organisational and institutional actors (although wider than 
the focus on innovation or knowledge alone implies – Ernst 2002), especially their 
adaptation and adjustment to changing priorities of local, national and global economies, 
although not limited to innovation or knowledge-based activities alone (Smith et al 2002).  
 
Using this perspective to make an initial assessment of the prospects for European OIRs, 
we would speculate that the poor performance of UK regions relative to those in the rest 
of Europe reflects the failure of UK based firms and policy makers to successfully 
develop processes of “value creation, enhancement and capture” (Coe et al 2004: 469) 
that mesh with the needs of TNCs. In a dynamic sense and despite the rhetoric of the 
New Labour Government there is a particular failure to adapt to the changing conditions 
of the knowledge economy. In particular, and despite the growth of high tech services 
activities, the failure to secure a high enough proportion of the value added activities in 
the high skilled manufacturing sectors appears to be a critical factor in explaining poor 
performance overall. This leads us to suggest that reliance upon service driven growth 
remains a flawed strategy for most of the British OIRs reflecting the continued 
dominance of the South-east of England over both economic and regional policy making 
(Massey 1984; Harvey 1999). Furthermore, we would speculate that even in the 
knowledge-based service sectors, the main areas of growth are likely to be in 
nontradeable support sectors rather than those that provide a sustainable export base. 
Other OIRS by comparison, seem, to date, to be more successful in their processes of 
adaptation, by holding onto sectors that are tradeable. It is worth pointing out that this 
extends to a better performance (and in some cases job growth) in low tech 
manufacturing, suggesting that regions in France and Germany are better able to 
withstand cost-based competition from newly industrialising countries in Asia as well as 
those closer to home in Eastern Europe.  
 
We would further speculate that underpinning these trends are differences in national and 
corporate governance systems, nature and forms of ownership and systems of 
employment relations, which enable these regions to deal more successfully in capturing 
value and securing economic returns from the key actors and processes at work in 
emerging global production networks. However, there is also a possibility that national 
level policies exacerbate the collapse of specific industrial structures because they avoid 
dealing with regionally-based issues (i.e. unemployment); for example, Beatty and 
Fothergill (2005: 839, 841) highlight the role played by incapacity benefits, especially in 
old industrial regions, that are now claimed by 7.5 % of the UK population, or 2.7 million 
people, compared with between 4 and 5 % in France, Germany and Spain. More 
importantly, in British old industrial regions the level of incapacity benefit claimants 
increases notably; e.g. in Easington, Durham, it is 21.1 % and in Glasgow 17.2 % (ibid. 
843). Although there has been less movement on this front between 1996 and 2002, the 
figures strongly suggest that these three countries have performed considerably better 
than the UK at adapting to changes in industrial structures during this period. 
 
In final conclusion, although Western Europe has continued to experience 
deindustrialisation and industrial restructuring, it has been unevenly spread across the 
four large countries we have considered here. Although it would appear as though UK old 
industrial regions have performed well against other OIRs in terms of economic growth 
(i.e. GDP), this disguises a number of weaknesses in the British economic system. British 
OIRs have performed poorly against the national average across both GDP and 
employment growth, compared with other European OIRs, but particularly poorly in 
relation to manufacturing employment change, whether high-tech or low-tech. The fact 
that Britain has lost around a quarter of its manufacturing employment between 1997 and 
2005 alone, attests to the continuing decline of these regions against national and other 
regional changes; a concern compounded by the expansion of incapacity benefits across 
the British OIRs. Whilst UK regions have performed better in relation to service sector 
employment growth, their inability to develop a stronger high-technology employment 
base suggests that British OIRs will continue to face processes of uneven development, 
unemployment, inactivity, and population decline, reinforcing the weak positioning of 
such regions within global networks of production, which makes addressing their ability 
to adapt and adjust to such changes of crucial importance.  
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NOTES: 
                                                 
i http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/lmsuk0206.pdf and http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/tsdtables1.asp?vlnk=lms  
ii In his updated version of The Limits to Capital, David Harvey (1999: xv) writes: “the public admission by 
Alan Budd, an erstwhile adviser to Margaret Thatcher, that the fight against inflation in the early 1980s was 
a cover for raising unemployment and reducing the strength of the working class”. 
iii According to Eurostat Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) “are a fictive currency unit that eliminates 
differences in purchasing power, i.e. different price levels, between countries. These parities are obtained as 
a weighted average of relative price ratios in respect to a homogeneous basket of goods and services, both 
comparable and representative for each country. They are fixed in a way that makes the average purchasing 
power of one Euro in the European Union equal to one PPS. The calculation of GDP in PPS is intended to 
allow the comparison of levels of economic activity of different sized economies irrespective of their price 
levels.” http://europa.eu.int/estatref/info/sdds/en/regio/gdp95_sm.htm#top  
iv High-tech manufacturing involves aerospace (NACE 35.3); pharmaceuticals (24.4); computers, office 
machinery (30); electronics-communications (32); and scientific instruments (33). Medium high-tech 
consists of electrical machinery (31); motor vehicles (34); chemicals, except pharmaceuticals (24 excluding 
24.4); other transport equipment (35.2, 35.4, 35.5); and non-electrical machinery (29) (Source: Eurostat). 
v Medium low-tech manufacturing consists of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel (NACE 
23); rubber and plastic products (25); non-metallic mineral products (26); shipbuilding (35.1); basic metals 
(27); and fabricated metal products (28). Low-tech covers other manufacturing and recycling (36, 37); 
wood, pulp, paper products, printing and publishing (20, 21, 22); food, beverages and tobacco (15, 16); and 
textile and clothing (17, 18, 19) (Source: Eurostat). 
vi Knowledge-intensive high-tech services include post and telecommunications (NACE 64); computer and 
related activities (72); and research and development (73) (Source: Eurostat). 
 
